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Reply to Predelli 
 
Stefano Predelli objects to my admittedly polemical remarks on ‘traditional semantic 
approaches’ and their ways of handling (or ignoring) context-sensitivity. Those 
approaches, he argues, can easily accommodate the phenomena I adduce against 
them. 
First, Predelli points out that there is an important distinction between 
presemantic processes such as disambiguation or the determination of the relevant 
contextual index, and the semantic mechanism which, given a disambiguated 
sentence and a contextual index, determines the truth-conditions of the sentence 
with respect to that index. The latter, but not the former, may be fully pragmatic and 
involve the hearer’s holistic appraisal of the speaker’s meaning. Once such a 
distinction is made, the existence of semantically underdeterminate expressions 
whose semantic value depends upon what the speaker means can no longer be 
considered as raising a problem for traditional approaches. What is automatic and 
independent of speaker’s meaning, for those theories, is only the semantic 
determination of truth-conditional content. The presemantic share of the work can be 
as pragmatic and messy as you please. So Predelli rejects my claim that the form of 
saturation triggered by semantically underdeterminate expressions is problematic 
from the traditional point of view.  
 With free enrichment, things are more subtle. Here Predelli admits that there is 
a prima facie problem for traditional accounts : the truth-value of an utterance of, say, 
‘this is red’ depends on contextual factors that are not traceable to the semantic 
contribution of any of the uttered expressions. But, he suggests, nothing prevents a 
traditional theorist from attempting to account for free enrichment, by adding to the 
theory a new layer of analysis : the ‘post-compositional’ layer. In this way progress 
can be made within the traditional framework, just as progress was made when the 
distinction between extension and intension, or that between content and character, 
was originally introduced. 
In response, let me say, first, that I do not think there is any substantial 
disagreement between Predelli and me, as far as I can understand. With respect to 
free enrichment, his account is not detailed enough for me to say whether I can 
accept it or not, but I have no doubt that some story can be told, by adding a new 
layer of analysis. The only clear point of disagreement concerns the history of ideas. 
Am I fair, or I  am unfair, to the semantic tradition — the tradition that began with 
Frege and took a new start with Montague — when I criticize it the way I do ? Predelli 
says I am unfair, and I want to defend myself. 
I take the semantic tradition to be deeply committed to a (tacit) philosophical 
view which I call ‘Literalism’ ; it is that view which I criticize. To say that the tradition is 
committed (by default, as it were) to a mistaken view is not to say that it is worthless, 
however ; on the contrary, I think the semantic tradition has been tremendoulsy (and 
unexpectedly) successful in dealing with natural language in the last thirty years. But 
to the extent that it has been successful, it has had to give up some of the basic 
literalist assumptions which it started by presupposing. This evolution away from 
Literalism and towards Contextualism was gradual and is still unfinished (I claim). 
According to me, four stages can be discerned in the historical development of 
the semantic tradition. The first two or three stages undboubtedly belong to the past, 
and Predelli does not want to defend the views that were then held. The first of these 
views is Proto-Literalism, according to which context-sensitivity is a defect of a 
natural language, to be ignored in theorizing about language. (This view was held at 
a time when logians and formally minded philosophers were not, or only marginally, 
interested in natural language.) Then came Eternalism, which holds that indexicality 
is a practical convenience rather than an essential feature of natural language. 
According to Eternalism, indexicality is not a defect — we could hardly communicate 
if natural language did not have that feature — but it is ‘in principle’ eliminable so that 
we can ignore it in theorizing about language. 
Next came Conventionalism. This view acknowledges the extent (and 
ineliminability) of context-sensitivity, but it draws a sharp contrast between the 
content of a sentence (with respect to context) and the content of the speech act 
performed by uttering that sentence. The content of the speech act depends upon 
the multicouloured context in all its richness and it can only  be determined on a 
pragmatic basis, by appealing to factors such as mutual beliefs, speaker’s intentions, 
etc. Things are different with regard to the content of the sentence. It is the linguistic 
conventions, not the speaker's intentions (or the hearer’s beliefs regarding the 
speaker’s intentions), which fix the content of the sentence with respect to context. 
Thus what determines the content of an indexical expression is not what is in the 
head of the language users, but a linguistic rule — the rule which constitutes the 
conventional meaning of that expression. 
Predelli argues that the determination of the index with respect to which an 
indexical sentence is interpreted is presemantic, hence it may involve pragmatic 
factors such as the speaker’s intentions without threatening the claim that the 
meaning of the sentence automatically fixes its content (with respect to an 
appropriate index). But this liberal stance is not acceptable from a Conventionalist 
point of view. Conventionalism rests on the idea that the truth-conditions of a 
disambiguated sentence are fixed by its linguistic meaning independent of speaker’s 
meaning. This determination is relative to some index, whose determination is indeed 
presemantic, but the determination of the index cannot itself depend upon what the 
speaker means on pains of falsifying the central conventionalist assumption. So 
when Predelli says that the traditional framework is compatible with the facts of 
semantic underdetemination, what he really means is that the traditional framework is 
not committed to Conventionalism (understood as I do). 
In a sense, I agree : Like Proto-Literalism and Eternalism, Conventionalism 
was but one step in the development of the semantic tradition. Conventionalism 
replaced Eternalism when the Eternalization Principle was abandoned. Contrary to 
Eternalism, Conventionalism still has advocates today ; but it is no longer the 
dominant position. It is widely acknowledged that the speaker's meaning has a role to 
play in fixing the truth-conditions of indexical sentences. On this, Predelli and I agree. 
We agree that semantics must take input from pragmatics, not only as far as 
disambiguation is concerned, but also when it comes to detemining the relevant 
‘index’. The index cannot be read off the context : it must be pragmatically 
determined. 
So there has been a misunderstanding. I never said that what Perry calls 
‘intentional indexicals’ (as opposed to ‘automatic indexicals’) raise a problem for 
current views , such as Predelli’s. The traditional framework constantly evolves, and it 
seems to me that most reasonable semanticists nowadays give up Conventionalism 
and accept that semantics needs an input from pragmatics even if we set 
disambiguation aside. But Conventionalism has been replaced by a new way of 
drawing the distinction between the content of the sentence and the content of the 
speech act. That new view, which dominates the scene today, is Minimalism. In the 
minimalist framework, the semantic content of the utterance departs only minimally 
from the linguistic meaning of the sentence type (hence the name 'Minimalism'); it 
departs from it only when the meaning of the sentence itself requires that some 
contextual value be assigned to a context-sensitive word or morpheme, or to a free 
variable in logical form. Now I think Minimalism must be given up in order to account 
for free enrichment, just as Conventionalism had to be given up to account for 
semantic under-determination. 
My claim, then, is this : the semantic tradition has its roots in the study of 
artificial languages, and it is historically committed to Literalism. Literalism, in 
general, minimizes context-sensitivity, which is a characteristic feature of natural 
language. Still, the semantic tradition has managed to deal with natural language, 
and has achieved considerable success in that endeavour. Inevitably, in the process, 
the literalist prejudice had to be given up. But the departure from Literalism has been 
slow and progressive. It is only recently that Conventionalism has been given up 
(some theorist still hold that sort of view) and I hold that some work has still to be 
done in this area — the aggiornamento is not completed yet : we still have to account 
for free enrichment and similar matters. Predelli seems to agree ; he himself attempts 
to show what such an account might look like. 
So what is  the difference between Predelli and me ? I do not deny that the 
semantic tradition can evolve and adapt itself to the facts of natural language. It has 
done so in the past, and it continues to do so today. So I am optimistic. On the other 
hand, as a philosopher I point out that this tradition has consistently tried to minimize 
context-sensitivity by adhering to whichever version of Literalism seemed defensible 
at the time, given the evidence then available. What the historical development of 
Literalism reveals is a gradual weakening of Literalism : from Proto-Literalism to 
Eternalism to Conventionalism to Minimalism. The question that naturally arises is: 
How far can we go in this direction? Where will this tendency ultimately lead us? And 
the obvious answer (for me) is: to Contextualism. I find nothing in Predelli’s argument 
that challenges this conclusion. 
